Abstract. Private information retrieval (PIR) is normally modeled as a game between two players: a user and a database. The user wants to retrieve some item from the database without the latter learning which item. Most current PIR protocols are ill-suited to provide PIR from a search engine or large database: i) their computational complexity is linear in the size of the database; ii) they assume active cooperation by the database server in the PIR protocol. If the database cannot be assumed to cooperate, a peer-to-peer user community is a natural alternative to achieve some query anonymity: a user submits a query on behalf of another user in the community. A peer-to-peer PIR system is described in this paper which relies on an underlying combinatorial structure to reduce the required key material and increase availability.
Introduction
In private information retrieval (PIR), a user wants to retrieve an item from a database or search engine without the latter learning which item the user is interested in. PIR was invented in 1995 by Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz and Sudan [3, 4] with the assumption that there are at least two copies of the same database, which do not communicate with each other. In the same paper, Chor et al. showed that single-database PIR (that is, with a single copy) is infeasible in the information-theoretic sense. However, two years later, Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [12] presented a method for constructing single-database PIR based on the algebraic properties of the Goldwasser-Micali public-key encryption scheme [6] . Subsequent developments in PIR are surveyed in [15] .
In the PIR literature the database is usually modeled as a vector. The user wishes to retrieve the value of the i-th component of the vector while keeping the index i hidden from the database. Thus, it is assumed that the user knows the physical address of the sought item, which might be too strong an assumption in many practical situations. Keyword PIR [2, 12] is a more flexible form of PIR: the user can submit a query consisting of a keyword and no modification in the structure of the database is needed.
We claim that PIR protocols proposed so far have two fundamental shortcomings which hinder their practical deployment:
1. The database is assumed to contain n items and PIR protocols attempt to guarantee maximum privacy, that is, maximum server uncertainty on the index i of the record retrieved by the user. Thus, the computational complexity of such PIR protocols is O(n), as proven in [3, 4] . Intuitively, all records in the database must be "touched"; otherwise, the server could rule out some of the records when trying to discover i. For large databases, an O(n) computational cost is unaffordable [1]. 2. It is assumed that the database server cooperates in the PIR protocol. However, it is the user who is interested in her own privacy, whereas the motivation for the database server is dubious. Actually, PIR is likely to be unattractive to most companies running queryable databases, as it limits their profiling ability. This probably explains why no real instances of PIRenabled databases can be mentioned.
If one wishes to run PIR against a search engine, there is another shortcoming beyond the lack of server cooperation: the database cannot be modeled as a vector in which the user can be assumed to know the physical location of the keyword sought. Even keyword PIR does not really fit, as it still assumes a mapping between individual keywords and physical addresses (in fact, each keyword is used as an alias of a physical address). A search engine allowing only searches of individual keywords stored in this way would be much more limited than real engines like Google or Yahoo.
In view of the above, in [11] a system is proposed in which a user masks her target query by ORing it with k − 1 fake queries and then submits the masked query to a search engine or large database which does not need to cooperate (in fact, it does not even need to know that the user is trying to protect her privacy). Rather than total privacy, this system provides a sort of k-privacy, in that it cloaks the target query within k queries. This system works fine but assumes that the frequencies of keywords and phrases that can appear in a query are known and available: for maximum privacy, the frequencies of the target and the fake queries should be similar.
Contribution and Plan of This Paper
We present a peer-to-peer private information retrieval system. It has the same practical philosophy of [11] ; however, rather than cloaking a query in a set of queries, the system described here cloaks a user in a peer-to-peer user community, because a user submits queries on behalf of her peers and conversely. This approach certainly requires the availability of peers (not needed in [11] ) but it has the advantage of not requiring knowledge of the frequencies of all possible keywords and phrases that can be queried.
The new scheme uses a type of combinatorial design called configuration to increase service availability and reduce the number of required keys (see [16, 13] for
